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1. Introduction
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the question of the merits of banks combining traditional com-
mercial banking activities and securities trading has reentered the economic policy debate. The
Volcker Rule in the US, the Vickers Report in the UK, and the Liikanen and European Commission
proposals in the EU are all intended to limit banks’ securities trading activities. Among policy
makers’ concerns is that banks use central bank borrowing, implicit government guarantees, or
direct government subsidies to fund risky securities trading activities instead of granting loans
to non-financial firms (Lehmann, 2016; Krahnen, Noth and Schüwer, 2017). In this paper, we
explore whether these concerns are justified and whether there is indeed a connection between
banks’ securities trading and lending. We analyze the effect of banks’ securities trading on bank
lending over the business cycle including both crisis periods and economically stable periods by
analyzing a sample of matched bank-borrower data covering the years 2003 to 2016. Most studies
investigating bank lending focus on banking in individual countries or narrow geographical regions.
Large banks, however, tend to operate globally across all of their business lines, including lending
and securities trading (Gambacorta and van Rixtel, 2013). Therefore, we consider it important to
investigate bank loan flows and securities trading activities in a global setting. We exploit a global
sample that includes 132 major banks from 21 countries and 7,763 borrowers from 76 countries
spanning North America, Europe, and Asia. This enables us to account for foreign lending and
differences in the depth of financial markets in which banks operate.
Banks have incentives to allocate funds to securities trading activities at the expense of lending
activities (Boot and Ratnovski, 2016). This allows banks to realize short-term profits that are
readily scalable, whereas lending requires banks to build and maintain long-term relationships that
produce information-based rents only in the long run. The effect intensifies as financial markets
become deeper and thus allow for larger trades. Indeed, Edwards and Mishkin (1995) and DeYoung
and Rice (2004) show a general trend toward declining profitability in relationship banking since
the 1990s due to increasingly deeper financial markets which have also provided borrowers with
2
more and cheaper alternatives to bank loans. Moreover, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2010)
document a deepening of, for example, the US financial market since the 1990s, and Svirydzenka
(2016) documents similar developments in other countries in Europe and Asia. In such an economic
environment, banks have incentives to allocate funds to trading rather than lending activities to
increase their level of risk and in turn increase expected returns. De Jonghe (2010), Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga (2010), Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia (2012), and De Young and Torna (2013) show
that banks’ non-lending activities are riskier than their lending activities and that, among non-lending
activities, securities trading is the riskiest activity. Thus, banks wishing to increase expected returns
have an incentive to increase securities trading while reducing bank lending. However, the presence
of implicit or explicit government guarantees exaggerates the incentives for banks to increase their
trading activities at the expense of relationship banking, as the funding costs of trading activities do
not fully reflect the risks (Krahnen et al., 2017). Since policy makers’ primary concern in providing
implicit guarantees for banks does not lie with bank profits but with the availability of bank loans to
consumers and non-financial firms, market outcomes in which banks increase securities trading and
decrease bank lending are likely considered sub-optimal from a policy perspective. The reduction
in loan supply due to banks’ securities trading activities may have implications for real economic
activity. Arping (2013) shows that while allocating funds to securities trading rather than lending
can be individually optimal for banks from a profit-maximization perspective, it may hamper growth
in the real economy because non-financial firms will find it increasingly difficult to obtain loan
financing. An impact on real economic activity would require a situation in which non-financial
firms are unable to replace bank loans with market-based forms of financing (Chodorow-Reich,
2014).
Using a regression specification similar to that suggested in Khwaja andMian (2008), we compare
the loan flows to the same borrower from banks with more and less extensive securities trading but
otherwise the same characteristics (intensive margin). Our results show that banks with greater
securities trading exhibit an approximately 20% lower annual loan growth than banks with less
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securities trading. Furthermore, we show that the reduction in loan supply due to extensive securities
trading also extends to loan flows from new and exiting lending relationships (extensive margin). In
line with Boot and Ratnovski (2016), we find that our results are primarily driven by banks that are
located in countries with deep financial markets. Exploiting our global sample, we show that banks
with extensive securities trading cut loan supply to a greater extent in their domestic market than
in foreign lending markets, despite an overall decline in foreign lending. Since securities trading
binds capital, this is consistent with the notion that foreign lending comes at the expense of domestic
lending when banks are capital constrained (Liu and Pogach, 2017). We also find that more securities
trading is associated with higher loan prices measured as the sum of fees and interest spread over
LIBOR.
Securities trading by banks also leads to a transmission of shocks from securities prices to bank
lending. Adrian and Shin (2013) show that banks’ trading-like activities are more cyclical than
traditional commercial banking activities. Banks possessing large inventories of securities expose
their balance sheets to price volatility in financial markets. If the value of the inventory of securities
decreases, banks must realize these reductions under mark-to-market accounting rules. Thus, banks
with large values of trading securities on their balance sheets may see significant amounts of their
equity being wiped out by losses from securities trading in the event of a significant shock to
securities prices. In line with this notion Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stiltz (2012) find that banks
with greater securities holdings experienced larger losses during the 2007 financial crisis that wiped
out part of the banks’ equity. As a consequence, banks reduced their loan supply in an effort to
deleverage (Bocola, 2016; Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger and Hirsch, 2018). Furthermore, Acharya,
Almeida, Ippolito and Perez (2014a), Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito and Perez (2014b), and Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010) provide evidence that banks reduce lending if their balance sheet strength is
compromised. Since depressed securities prices are typically only temporary during financial crises,
Diamond and Rajan (2011) and Abbassi, Iyer, Peydro and Tous (2016) argue that banks with limited
liability and implicit government guarantees have an incentive to allocate their remaining funds to
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purchase securities at fire-sales prices from sellers in need of liquidity. Thus, banks further reduce
loan supply to free up resources for the purchase of securities, leading to a transmission of a shock
from securities prices to bank lending (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Stein, 2013).
Focusing on the additional impact of financial crises, our results show that the gap in loan supply
between banks with more securities trading and those with less securities trading increases even
further. We observe approximately 31% lower loan growth during periods of financial crisis when
stress in financial markets is high. This additional effect is driven by differences in financial market
depth across bank countries.
Our paper is closely related to Abbassi, Iyer, Peydro and Tous (2016), who show that German
banks with trading expertise participated in such fire-sales purchases of assets during the 2007
financial crisis. Beyond the results reported in Abbassi et al. (2016), we show, however, that the global
dimension of bank lending and securities matters by gauging the effects on foreign vs. domestic
lending and by showing that the negative impact of securities trading on bank lending is driven
by financial market depth in banks’ home markets. Moreover, while the analysis in Abbassi et al.
(2016) only captures the intensive margin, our results also extend to the extensive margin.
Our paper adds to the empirical literature that investigates different types of bank lending channels
– i.e., reduced loan supply in response to shocks to banks’ balance sheets. Among these channels,
the most prominent is the bank lending channel of monetary policy (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette,
2012; Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina, 2012, 2014). Additionally, Cingano, Manaresi and
Sette (2016) and Iyer, Peydro, da Rocha-Lopes and Schoar (2014) consider shocks to interbank
lending. Our paper contributes to this literature along two lines. First, similar to Abbassi et al.
(2016), we document bank lending channel that negatively affects loan supply through shocks to
securities prices. This extents the understanding of potential transmission mechanisms from shocks
to financial markets via the banking system to the real economy. Second, our paper investigates the
bank lending channel global setting, contributing to the understanding of the transmission of shocks
to banks’ balance sheets across lending markets in different countries.
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2. Data and Variables
We use data on bank lending from Thomson Reuters’ LPC DealScan database, which provides
extensive coverage of the global corporate loan market. The bank lending data are augmented
with bank and borrower characteristics from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. Since LPC
DealScan and Compustat do not share any common identifier, we hand-match all borrower, bank,
and loan information. We collect information on corporate loans extended by 132 major banks in 21
countries between 2003 and 2016 to 7,763 non-financial firms in 76 countries, including advanced
and emerging economies. The 132 banks in our sample account for approximately 81% of the total
loan amount in the LPC DealScan during our sample period. Consistent with the literature, we
aggregate all loans to each bank’s parent company (see, e.g., Sufi (2007)) and track bank mergers
over our sample period (see, e.g., Schwert (2018)). Our banks are based in the US, Canada, the
UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, Brazil, and Australia. We
further augment our dataset with country-level data on financial market conditions and financial
system development from the US Office of Financial Research and the International Monetary Fund.
Our dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of the loan volume by a specific bank to a
specific borrower in a given year. In most studies investigating bank loan supply effects, detailed
information from national credit registers is used to obtain data on changes in individual loan volumes.
While national credit registers provide very detailed information on bank-borrower relationships, they
restrict studies to the analysis of only a single country, and few countries have credit registers. Large
universal banks tend to operate globally across all of their business lines (see, e.g., Gambacorta and
van Rixtel (2013)). Using the LPC DealScan database instead of a national credit register allows us
to analyze a global sample of banks and borrowers and to investigate cross-border lending. However,
our corporate loan data differ from credit register data in two important ways. First, we cannot
observe changes in a particular loan over time because we only observe loans at the time of their
origination. Second, the loans in our sample tend to have long maturities. These two properties
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of our loans imply that for a large number of firms, there is no meaningful time-series variation in
bank-firm loan volumes. To address this issue, we follow Acharya et al. (2018) and aggregate firms
into clusters based on the country of incorporation, the two-digit SIC code, and the median EBITDA
interest coverage ratio. We expect firms that are incorporated in the same country and that are active
in the same industry to share sufficiently similar characteristics. Furthermore, credit ratings are
an important determinant of bank lending. Therefore, firms with the same rating will have similar
access to the loan market or other sources of financing (see, e.g., Diamond (1991), Erel, Julio, Kim
and Weisbach (2011)). Thus, we further match firms in the country-industry clusters based on
their median interest coverage ratio. Thus, our dependent variable is the change in the logarithm
of the total USD volume of loans granted by a bank to all firms in the same cluster in a given year.
This aggregation of individual firms into clusters leaves us with 23,876 unique bank-firm cluster
connections, such that the average firm cluster consists of approximately 4.5 firms. We present the
summary statistics for the firm clusters in our sample in Table A.4 in the appendix. The firm clusters
in our sample are comparable but rather large in terms of the book value of total assets. However,
the clusters are diverse in their leverage and changes in cash holdings, with the net debt-to-assets
ratios ranging from 4.3% to 68.2% and changes in cash as a share of assets ranging from −5.3% to
+8.4%. This clearly indicates variation in the need for bank financing across our firm clusters.
Our main independent variable is a measure of banks’ proprietary trading. We measure bank
proprietary trading in two ways. First, we measure proprietary trading directly as the volume of a
bank’s trading account divided by its total assets. The trading account reflects the mark-to-market
value of all fixed income and equity securities purchased for resale to other financial institutions or
the public in the near term.1 Second, consistent with the approach used in Abbassi et al. (2016), we
rely on the notion that banks, to maintain or build a strong presence in securities trading and thus to
1Ideally, we would like to observe when banks buy or sell securities. However, changes in the USD volume of a
bank’s trading account cannot be used to identify when banks are trading. Since the volume is the product of market
price and quantity (mark-to-market value), increases in quantity due to banks’ purchases of securities could be offset by
the prices of the same securities falling. Therefore, we use the mark-to-market value of a bank’s trading account.
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accumulate trading expertise, require a specific infrastructure. Arguably, direct trading memberships
at important securities exchanges are among the most relevant aspects of such trading infrastructure,
as they allow for direct access to the trading floors and trading and clearing systems of the respective
exchanges without the need for intermediate brokers.
Thus, for each bank in our sample, we count the total number of trading memberships at Euronext
(the European multi-country exchange), the London Exchange, NYSE, NASDAQ, the Toronto
Exchange, the Japan Exchange (covering all Japanese exchanges), the Hong Kong Exchange, the
Shanghai Exchange, BMnF Bovespa (Brazil), the Australian Securities Exchange, and the Deutsche
Börse (the German Exchange). Each of these exchanges has been listed as one of the ten largest
exchanges in terms of market capitalization at least once during our sample period. A bank is
considered a trading member of one of these exchanges if it has purchased the right to directly access
the trading floor. If a bank has access to more than one market of the same exchange (equity, fixed
income, and/or derivatives), we count this as one membership at the relevant exchange.2
We hand collect the trading membership information from the websites of the relevant exchanges
and from company reports. While all banks in our sample offer trading services to their clients, it is
not necessary for a bank to possess a trading membership at an exchange to offer such services. Such
a bank could handle all trading, including trading on behalf of clients, via external broker-dealers.
Even if a bank were to purchase a trading membership to more easily offer trading services to clients,
this would hardly require more than a single membership at one or at most two major exchanges.
Thus, we would expect banks with a large number of exchange memberships to have strong trading
operations, a higher level of trading expertise, and consequently a stronger inclination towards
proprietary trading. Our notion of interpreting greater (trading) activity as a sign of greater (trading)
expertise is consistent with a large base of theoretical and empirical literature on organizational
learning-by-doing (see, e.g., Jarmin (1994), Thompson (2010), Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011)).
2Note that it is not necessary for foreign banks to possess a banking license in the relevant country to purchase a
membership.
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Therefore, instead of a simple count variable of the number of exchange memberships as a proxy for
trading, we consider a dummy variable that equals one for banks with more than two memberships.
This reflects the idea that banks with only one or two memberships use those primarily for client-
related trading, while true proprietary traders require a larger number of trading memberships in
various markets around the world.
Consistent with our argument, Figure 1 indicates that the USD volume of a bank’s trading account
as a fraction of its total assets tends to be larger the more trading memberships the bank possesses.
Note that for all panels in Figure 1, there is an upward jump in securities trading for banks with
more than two memberships. This supports the previously outlined approach of defining a trading
bank dummy that equals one if a bank has more than two memberships and zero otherwise.
We estimate a correlation coefficient of 0.6 between the number of exchange memberships and
the volume of the trading account divided by total assets, which is statistically significant at the
one percent level. Moreover, a simple OLS regression of the number of trading memberships on
the trading account as a fraction of total assets and a constant yields R2 = 0.545. A larger trading
account volume indicates greater securities trading by banks.
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Figure 1: Trading Account and Trading Memberships
Notes: In the boxplot, we show the volume of the securities trading account as a fraction of the total assets for different
counts of trading memberships in exchanges. The sample consists of 132 major banks based in 21 countries between
2003 and 2016. Panel a) shows the boxplot for the full sample period, and panels b) to d) show the boxplots for the
various sub-periods. The continuous variable (y-axis) represents the USD volume of the trading/dealing account
divided by the USD (book value) of total assets. The categorical variable (x-axis) represents the number of trading
memberships at major exchanges. We count memberships at Euronext (the European multi-country exchange), the
London Exchange, NYSE, NASDAQ, the Toronto Exchange, the Japan Exchange (covering all Japanese exchanges), the
Hong Kong Exchange, the Shanghai Exchange, BMnF Bovespa (Brazil), the Australian Securities Exchange, and the
Deutsche Börse (the German Exchange).
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b) Pre-Crisis period
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c) Crisis period
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d) Post-crisis period
Securities trading is naturally affected by financial market conditions. Thus, we augment our
dataset with the Financial Stress Index developed by the US Office for Financial Research (OFR).
The Financial Stress Index is a continuous measure of stress in financial markets that accounts for
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contributions to stress from bond markets, equity valuations, and implied and realized volatility from
bond, equity, currency, and commodity markets. Monin (2017) provides details on the construction
of the index, data sources, and weights for each index element. The index is centered on zero,
where positive values indicate increased stress, and negative values indicate relaxation. Thus,
using the index, we can obtain a granular view of financial market conditions over time. Since the
index distinguishes three different world regions (the US, other advanced economies, and emerging
economies), we can account for the fact that emerging economies were less affected by the 2007-2009
financial crisis than advanced economies were. This impact is documented in, e.g., Blanchard, Das
and Faruqee (2010). In particular, emerging Asia was affected to a lesser extent than advanced
economies were (see, e.g., Goldstein and Xie (2009), Keat (2009)). Thus, we consider it important to
account for these differences. As an alternative to directly using the Financial Stress Index, we create
a bank-country-specific dummy variable, Financial Crisis, that equals one if the Financial Stress
Index has a value greater than 5 and zero otherwise. The particular cutoff value of 5 is motivated
by the fact that the Financial Stress Index is on average 5.55 during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
We show the time series of the Financial Stress Index for the US, other advanced economies, and
emerging economies in Figure 2. “Other Advanced Economies” comprises primarily Europe and
Japan. An index value of zero suggests that stress is at normal levels, and a positive (negative) value
indicates increased (decreased) stress. USA covers the US economy. The index clearly identifies
the last financial crisis for all three regions, indicating extreme financial stress during that period.
In line with previous research, the index clearly shows less financial stress in emerging economies
than in advanced economies (see, e.g., Blanchard et al. (2010), Goldstein and Xie (2009), Keat
(2009)). The time series for the US and all other advanced economies almost completely overlap
throughout the sample period. These two time series share a correlation coefficient of approximately
0.94, indicating almost perfect co-movement. The correlation coefficient between the time series
for the US and the emerging economies is 0.77, and that for the EU and the emerging economies
is 0.84. This suggests that a simple crisis dummy would be sufficient to capture the crisis timing
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globally but not the severity of the impact. In terms of the severity of the impact of the crisis, it
appears to be sufficient to distinguish between advanced and emerging economies. Finally, the bank
control variables included in our dataset capture differences in bank size, profitability, and funding.
The control variables comprise the logarithm of the book value of total assets, ROA, the capital
ratio, liquidity ratio, and the loans-to-deposits ratio. The data for these controls are obtained from
Compustat. ROA is computed as the income before extraordinary items, divided by the book value
of total assets. The capital ratio is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the book value of
total assets. The liquidity ratio is computed as the ratio of cash to total assets. The loans-to-deposits
ratio is computed as the ratio of total loans to total deposits. Furthermore, at the borrower level,
we use the logarithm of the book value of total assets, capital expenditure divided by total assets,
employment growth net of the debt-to-assets ratio, intangible assets-to-assets ratio, and the change
in cash and cash equivalents. Net debt is the sum of short-term and long-term liabilities minus cash
and cash equivalents.
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Figure 2: Is Financial Stress in Crisis Periods the Same Around the World?
Notes: In this figure, we show the value of the Financial Stress Index of the US Office of Financial Research. The index
is a measure of systemic financial stress, capturing contributions to financial stress from credit, equity valuations,
funding, safe assets, and volatility. An index value of zero suggests that stress is at normal levels, and a positive
(negative) value indicates increased (decreased) stress. Other Advanced Economies covers advanced economies other
than the US, primarily the EU and Japan. Emerging covers emerging markets. For details on the index’s computation
and coverage, see Monin (2017).
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3. Bank Lending – Empirical Framework
3.1. Panel Regression
Our aim is to investigate whether banks with extensive trading operations provide fewer loans
in the corporate loan market than banks with less extensive trading operations. To answer this
question, we apply a modified version of the Khwaja and Mian (2008) regression specification.
Consider an economy in which firms borrow from multiple banks. Such an economy may experience
two kinds of observationally equivalent shocks to bank lending: firm-specific loan demand shocks
and bank-specific loan supply shocks. Loan demand shocks reflect unobserved changes to firms’
fundamentals, such as shocks to productivity or customer demand. Loan supply shocks reflect
changes in banks’ funding situations, such as variations in the availability of deposits or short-term
liquidity or, as is the focus in this paper, the redirection of available funds from corporate lending to
proprietary trading. Therefore, it is necessary to use an econometric specification that allows us to
isolate the relevant loan supply effect. Initially, we estimate the following model:
∆Log (LoanV olume)ijt = βTradingit−1 + δXit−1 + γjt + γbank country t + vijt (1)
where the dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of the loan volume by bank i to firm
cluster j in year t.3 The main idea of this approach is the use of matched bank-borrower data to
track bank-borrower relationships over time. This allows us to use the loan flow from one bank to
3The use of firm clusters in such a regression may raise a number of concerns. Veredas and Petkovic (2010)
demonstrate that aggregating individual observations into groups in panel datasets with a low time frequency (i.e.,
yearly) does not affect the model structure. The estimated coefficients remain unbiased and correspond to the coefficients
of the individual-level regressions. However, heteroskedasticity is introduced due to the aggregation of individual firms.
The heteroskedasticity is straightforward to address through the common cluster robust estimator of variance. These
statements are easy to verify using standard arguments, and we do so in Appendix C. Thus, for all regressions, we cluster
standard errors at the bank and firm-cluster level or at the firm-cluster level, depending on the particular regression
specification. Moreover, aggregating individual observations into clusters may also raise concerns regarding Simpson’s
paradox (see Simpson (1951), Blyth (1972)), i.e., the phenomenon whereby a trend may appear within groups of the
data but reverses if the individual observations in the groups are aggregated. However, the inclusion of cluster fixed
effects that act as cluster-specific intercepts in our regression models prevents trends in the groups from reversing after
aggregating the observations.
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one borrower as a dependent variable and to enrich the regression with borrower-level fixed effects
and bank-level control variables. The latter will capture supply effects, and the former will capture
loan demand. Whereas Equation (1) is represented in reduced form, Khwaja and Mian (2008) shows
that it can be derived as an equilibrium condition by explicitly modeling loan supply and demand.
Equation (1) includes two different fixed effects. The borrower × year fixed effects γjt account
for time-varying, unobserved heterogeneity in borrower characteristics that proxy for loan demand
(see Khwaja and Mian (2008)). Loan supply effects are captured through the bank characteristics
included in Xit−1 and in Tradingit−1. Thus, in line with our first hypothesis, we expect βˆ < 0,
indicating that banks with more extensive securities trading reduce loan supply to their corporate
borrowers. Since the firm clusters are the same for all banks, β indicates how the same borrower’s
loan growth from one bank changes relative to that from another bank that has less extensive
trading operations. We also include bank country × year fixed effects γbank country t to account
for time-varying macroeconomic conditions and regulatory environments in a bank’s country of
incorporation. Moreover, we include a vectorXit−1 of one-year-lagged bank control variables in
our model, where δ denotes the corresponding vector of the regression coefficients. Jimenez, Mian,
Peydro and Saurina (2011) argue that if unobservable borrower characteristics that affect the lending
relationship were systematically correlated with the extent of securities trading, then there should
be a sizable difference in estimated βs when estimating Equation (1) with borrower × year fixed
effects γjt and without these fixed effects. Such a correlation would imply that some borrowers
have a preference for borrowing from banks with large trading operations. Therefore, comparing
the sign and magnitude of estimated β in Equation (1) with and without fixed effects γjt provides
us with some intuition regarding the importance of such borrower behavior in our sample. Our
coefficient of interest is β, where Tradingit−1 is either bank i’s trading account divided by total
assets or a dummy variable indicating whether bank i has more than two trading memberships at
different securities exchanges. Since total assets include both trading securities and loans, we use
the one-year-lagged trading securities to total assets ratio to avoid any purely mechanical connection
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with the change in loan volume.
The regression specification in Equation (1) is a variant of the current workhorse model for
disentangling loan demand from loan supply effects in empirical banking research. In particular,
if some borrowers have a preference for borrowing from banks with large trading operations, it is
important to use the fixed effects specification in Equation (1). However, Paravisini, Rappoport and
Schnabl (2017) and Repullo (2018) raise concerns that time-varying borrower fixed effects may not
fully absorb loan demand effects. If that were the case, then we could not interpret the estimated
coefficient β as a pure supply-side effect, and its interpretation would be unclear. To mitigate such
concerns, we also apply an alternative approach, suggested by Repullo (2018), and replace the
borrower × year fixed effects with a set of borrower characteristicsHjt and borrower country ×
year fixed effects γBorrower country t and borrower industry × year fixed effects γBorrower SIC t. The
latter are included to control for country- and industry-level loan demand shocks. The corresponding
regression model is represented in Equation (2).
∆Log (LoanV olume)ijt = β˜T radingit−1 + δXit−1 + ηHjt+ (2)
+γBorrower country t + γBorrower SIC t + γbank country t + v˜ijt,
As suggested by Repullo (2018), if borrower × year fixed effects indeed sufficiently absorb loan
demand effects, then we expect the estimated coefficients β in Equation (1) and β˜ in Equation (2)
to have the same sign and to be similar in magnitude.4 Therefore, by comparing our regression
results from Equation (1) and Equation (2), we test the ability of borrower × year fixed effects γjt to
account for loan demand effects.
4Note that one advantage of the specification suggested by Repullo (2018) is that estimation is not restricted to
multiple-bank borrowers as in the Khwaja and Mian (2008) specification. However, since all of our firm clusters borrow
from multiple banks, this is of little concern in our specific application.
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3.2. Crisis Impact
The fire sale hypothesis on bank trading (see, e.g., Abbassi et al. (2016), Diamond and Rajan
(2011))) suggests that any negative effect of trading on loan supply should be stronger during
periods of financial crisis characterized by high volatility and falling asset prices than in periods of
stability. We therefore interact Tradingit−1 with the Financial Stress Indicator FSIit and estimate
the following regression equation:
∆Log (LoanV olume)ijt = βTradingit−1 + φFSIit + ξ(Tradingit−1FSIit)
+ δXit + γjt + γbank country + vijt, (3)
In this specification, the marginal effect of Tradingit−1 depends on the level of stress in the financial
market and is given by βˆ + ξˆ × FSIit. Under the fire sale hypothesis, we expect ξˆ < 0. Note that
because the Financial Stress Indicator FSIit is bank country specific, we have to replace the bank
country × year fixed effects with bank country fixed effects.5
4. Main Results on Bank Lending
In this section, we present the results of the estimation of our models in Equations (1), (2), and
(3). In columns (3) and (4) of Table 1, we report the results for Equation (1). For the exchange
membership dummy, Trading Memberships, we find a negative, statistically significant β coefficient
that indicates an approximately 20% reduction in loan supply relative to banks with fewer than
2 trading memberships. Using Securities Trading as our trading proxy also yields a negative,
statistically significant coefficient of similar magnitude. However, the economic size of the effect is
smaller. A one-standard-deviation increase in Securities Trading corresponds to a decrease in loan
supply of approximately 7.6%. Overall, this supports our hypothesis that banks’ trading activity
5Implicitly, we assume that stress in the financial markets of a bank’s home region is the most influential on the
bank’s trading behavior.
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negatively affects loan supply. Both trading proxies yield effects that are not only statistically
significant but also economically meaningful. Columns (1) and (2) present the results of our model
in Equation (1) estimated without the firm cluster × year fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) show
the results when we include firm cluster × year fixed effects. The β coefficients are similar, but the
difference in coefficients for Securities Trading is larger than the difference for Trading Memberships
but is not statistically significant.6 These differences in the estimated coefficients reflect potential
bias induced by endogenous matching between borrowers and banks that is absorbed by firm cluster
× year fixed effects.
Columns (5) to (6) contain the estimation results for the specifications in which firm cluster× year
fixed effects are replaced with firm cluster characteristics, industry × year fixed effects, and country
× year fixed effects as described in Equation (2). The estimated coefficients associated with Trading
Memberships and Securities Trading under the specification of columns (5) to (6) are remarkably
similar to those obtained in columns (3) and (4). This suggests that the coefficients indeed can be
interpreted as supply effects and that the fixed effects in our Khwaja and Mian (2008) specification
in Equation (1) sufficiently control for variations in loan demand. However, the specifications in
columns (3) and (4) yield a higher adjusted R2 than any of the other specifications, suggesting that
this specification fits the data better. Therefore, we maintain the firm cluster × year fixed effects
setup as our preferred specification.
6The estimated coefficients for Securities Trading in columns (1) and (3) both lie within one another’s 95% confidence
intervals.
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Table 1: Securities Trading and Bank Lending
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the regressions defined in Equations (1) and (2). The unit of observation
is firm cluster-bank-year. Firm clusters are formed based on a firm’s country of incorporation, the two-digit SIC code,
and a firm’s credit rating, estimated based on the median EBIT interest coverage ratios. Trading Memberships equals
one if a bank has more than two trading memberships at securities exchanges and zero otherwise. Securities Trading is
the one-year-lagged USD value of a bank’s trading account divided by its total assets. Columns (1) to (2) show the
results for Equation (1) estimated without firm cluster × year fixed effects, columns (3) and (4) show the corresponding
results including the firm cluster × year fixed effects. Columns (5) and (6) show the results for Equation (2). Associated
estimated coefficients for the borrower-level controls in columns (5) and (6) are reported in Table B.1 in the Appendix.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Securities Tradingi,t−1 −0.165 −0.215∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.106) (0.107)
Trading Membershipsi −0.188∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
log(Total Assets)i,t−1 0.311∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Liquidity Ratioi,t−1 0.647∗∗ 0.217 1.735∗∗∗ 1.353∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.327) (0.325) (0.319) (0.325) (0.318)
Capital Ratioi,t−1 2.499∗∗∗ 2.434∗∗∗ 3.928∗∗∗ 3.854∗∗∗ 3.561∗∗∗ 3.603∗∗∗
(0.685) (0.685) (0.615) (0.598) (0.617) (0.605)
Loans-To-Depositsi,t−1 0.079∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
ROAi,t−1 6.945∗∗∗ 4.676 6.502∗∗∗ 4.592∗∗ 6.951∗∗∗ 5.439∗∗
(2.493) (2.509) (2.106) (2.119) (2.199) (2.211)
Firm Cluster-Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO
Bank Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Borrower Country-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Borrower SIC-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 267,326 267,326 267,326 267,326 267,326 267,326
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.076 0.375 0.376 0.215 0.216
In Table 2, we present the estimation results for the regression specification including the interac-
tion term with the financial stress measure as described in Equation (3). In Table 2, Financial Stress
denotes the Financial Stress Index. The Financial Stress Index is not a crisis indicator in this sense.
Only large values indicate a financial crisis, while the index fluctuates around zero throughout the
business cycle. We also define an alternative proxy, the Financial Crisis dummy, that isolates the
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impact of the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, Financial Crisis denotes a dummy variable that equals
one if the value of the Financial Stress Index is greater than 5 and zero otherwise, where values
of the Financial Stress Index above 5 correspond to the 2008 financial crisis period (years 2007
– 2009) in our sample. Columns (1) to (2) contain results for the regression specification using
Securities Trading as a measure of banks’ trading. Only the interaction terms between Securities
Trading and the Financial Crisis dummy and the Financial Stress index are negative and statistically
significant, while the direct effect of Securities Trading is not significant. This suggests that the
loan-reducing effect of securities trading occurs primarily during the financial crisis, when stress
in financial markets peaks. Columns (3) to (4) contain results using the Trading Memberships
dummy as a measure of banks’ trading. Using the Trading Memberships dummy as proxy for banks’
trading, we find similar results. The economic size of the effect of banks’ trading on lending is
substantial. The marginal effect associated with Trading Memberships during the financial crisis is a
31.13% reduction in loan supply relative to banks with fewer trading memberships. The coefficient
associated with Trading Memberships in column (4) captures the effect of securities trading for
Financial Stress Index values of zero, i.e., in the absence of either positive or negative stress. The
negative and statistically significant coefficient associated with the interaction term indicates that
banks with more extensive securities trading tend to reduce their loan supply by an additional 4.11
percentage points per unit increase in financial stress relative to the 20% baseline reduction (statistics
are approximate). In contrast, we do not find a significant effect for the Financial Stress Index alone.
While evidently there was a considerable impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the corporate loan
market, this could suggest that the Financial Stress Index can capture the direct link between the
crisis and lending but only through banks’ securities trading activities.
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Table 2: Securities Trading and Bank Lending during the Crisis
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the regressions defined in Equation (3). The unit of observation
is firm cluster-bank-year. Firm clusters are formed based on a firm’s country of incorporation, the two-digit SIC
code, and a firm’s credit rating, estimated based on the median EBIT interest coverage ratios. Trading Member-
ships equals one if a bank has more than two trading memberships at securities exchanges and zero otherwise.
Securities Trading is the one-year-lagged USD value of a bank’s trading account divided by its total assets. Fi-
nancial Stress is the value of the Financial Stress Indicator as provided by the US OFR for a bank’s country of
incorporation. Financial Crisis is a dummy variable that equals one if financial stress is above 5 and zero other-
wise. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Securities Tradingi,t−1 −0.132 −0.119
(0.092) (0.092)
Trading Membershipsi −0.175∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Financial Crisis −0.818∗∗∗
(0.101)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Financial Stresst −0.154∗∗∗
(0.014)
Trading Membershipsi*Financial Crisis −0.196∗∗∗
(0.026)
Trading Membershipsi*Financial Stresst −0.042∗∗∗
(0.004)
Financial Crisis −0.167∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.047)
Financial Stresst 0.009 0.002
(0.009) (0.008)
log(Total Assets)i,t−1 0.483∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Liquidity Ratioi,t−1 1.164∗∗∗ 1.225∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.227) (0.218) (0.218)
Capital Ratioi,t−1 3.753∗∗∗ 3.647∗∗∗ 3.725∗∗∗ 3.583∗∗∗
(0.497) (0.501) (0.484) (0.489)
Loans-To-Depositsi,t−1 0.110∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
ROAi,t−1 13.825∗∗∗ 14.532∗∗∗ 12.217∗∗∗ 12.594∗∗∗
(1.546) (1.563) (1.559) (1.575)
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Bank Country FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 264,716 264,716 264,716 264,716
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.372 0.373 0.373
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In Figure 3a, we visualize the marginal effect of Trading Memberships for the observed range
of values of the Financial Stress Index.7 In Figure 3b, we visualize the same effect for Securities
Trading. The positive values of the index indicate financial market stress, and negative values
indicate financial market relaxation (stabilizing conditions). The marginal effect is downward
sloping and statistically significant, with a relatively narrow confidence interval across the whole
range of Financial Stress Index values. This supports our earlier interpretation that banks with
more extensive securities trading tend to reduce loan supply even under favorable financial market
conditions but reduce loan supply even further with increasing financial market stress. In the figure,
we highlight the marginal effects for the zero values of the Financial Stress Index, its 2007 to 2009
crisis average, and its 2007 to 2009 crisis peak value.
Figure 3: The Effect of Securities Trading as a Function of Financial Stress
In this figure, we visualize marginal effects associated with the coefficient estimates reported in columns (2) and (4) of
Table 2 for Securities Trading and Trading Memberships, respectively. Marginal effects are computed for a range
of values of the Financial Stress Index. The Financial Stress Index is centered on zero. Positive values of the index
indicate financial market stress, and negative values indicate financial market relaxation (stabilizing conditions). See
Figure 2 for a plot of the time series of the index. During the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis, the index peaked, close to a
value of 15, with an average from 2007 to 2009 of approximately 5.55. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence bands
based on marginal effects’ standard errors that are derived from the clustered variance-covariance matrix of estimated
coefficients reported in Table 2, columns (2) and (4).
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In summary, we find support for the hypothesis that banks with greater securities trading provide
fewer loans to non-financial borrowers and reduce loan supply, especially during financial crises.
These findings confirm the theoretical predictions of Diamond and Rajan (2011), Shleifer and Vishny
(2010), and Boot and Ratnovski (2016).
4.1. Trading and Foreign Lending
Home biases in lending and a decline in foreign lending since the 2008 financial crisis are well
documented in the literature (Marchetti, 2016). Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that home bias
increased during the crisis. Our aim in this section is to contribute to this literature by analyzing the
effect of banks’ securities trading on foreign lending. We define Foreign Lending as loans granted
by a bank to a borrower that is incorporated in a country other than the bank. Thus, we create a
dummy variable that equals one if a bank and borrower’s countries of incorporation differ and zero
otherwise. We also consider the geographic and economic distance between a bank and borrower’s
countries of incorporation as continuous measures of the degree to which the bank and borrower
countries differ. We compute the geographic Distance between the bank and borrower countries
using the great-circle distance formula used in physics and navigation. The great-circle distance is
the shortest distance between any two points on the surface of a sphere and is computed as
Distancei,j = r × arccos (sin (Lati) sin (Latj) + cos (Lati) cos (Latj) cos (Longi − Longj))
where Lati, Latj and Longi, Longj are the latitude and longitude, respectively, of the centroids
of bank country i and borrower country j.8 r is Earth’s mean radius in km (≈ 6,371 km).9 Since
Distancei,j is heavily skewed, we use the logarithm of Distancei,j in all regressions. If bank
and borrower are incorporated in the same country, we set Distancei,j = 1 instead of using the
8The centroid of a country is the geometric center of the two-dimensional polygon spanned by the country’s borders.
9That is ≈ 3,959 miles.
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great-circle distance.10 Thus, the logarithm of the geographic distance equals zero whenever the
foreign lending dummy equals zero. We proxy for the economic distance between bank and borrower
countries using the absolute value of the difference in the KOF Globalisation Index. The index is a
measure of the level of globalization of individual countries along economic, social, and political
dimensions.11
We repeat our estimation of our Equation (1) but augment the regression model with the foreign
lending dummy, the geographic distance measure, and the economic distance measure.12 In columns
(1) to (3) of Table 3, we present the results for the foreign lending dummy, with geographic and
economic distance measured in the specification using Trading Memberships. Columns (4) to
(6) contain the results using Securities Trading instead. The coefficients associated with foreign
lending are consistently negative and statistically significant across all specifications, indicating a
rather strong lending home bias among the banks in our sample. The coefficients of interest in this
regression specification are the interactions between our trading measures Trading Memberships or
Securities Trading and the Foreign Lending variables. The interaction term coefficients are positive
and statistically significant for all regression specifications, except for column (6). Thus, banks with
10This approach simply implies that we assume that the physical distance in km between bank and borrower is 1 if
both are incorporated in the same country.
11The KOF Index is computed and published by the Swiss Economic Institute at ETH Zürich. See https://
kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html. For details
regarding the computation of the index, see Dreher (2006) (the original version of the index) and Gygli, Haelg and
Sturm (2018) (the revised version of the index that is used in this paper). Since the most current KOF Globalisation
Index is only available until 2015, we augment the values for 2016 for each country using qsimple AR(p) one-year-ahead
forecasts, while for each country’s time-series, the lag-length p is selected to minimize the AIC. Using data until 2015
only does not change the results. We show the results for data ranging only until 2015 in Table D.1 in Appendix D
12Approximately 65.6% of all bank-borrower loan connections in our sample can be described as foreign lending.
However, many of these loans are granted within the European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA essentially covers
the EU plus Switzerland and Norway. Common regulatory frameworks in many areas and an overall comparatively
high degree of economic integration lead to a lower risk of foreign lending for EEA banks to EEA borrowers. For
example, it is significantly easier to enforce contracts across borders within the EEA than outside the EEA because
of the comparatively high degree of harmonization of regulations within the EEA. Thus, the EEA might be seen as
a single lending market. If we treat the EEA as if it were one country in our definition of foreign lending, the share
of bank-borrower loan connections that imply foreign lending is approximately 49.8%. We repeat our analysis of the
connection of securities trading and foreign lending, treating the EEA as a single country. The corresponding results are
shown in Table D.2 in Appendix D. While the magnitude of some coefficients changes, the conclusions remain the
same as in our main analysis in Table 3.
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more extensive trading operations tend to increase their loan supply to foreign markets relative to
banks with less extensive trading operations. However, the marginal effects of Trading Memberships
and Securities Trading remain negative in most cases. Liu and Pogach (2017) show that when capital
is tight during stable economic times, foreign lending comes at the expense of domestic lending.
Using the notion that trading banks need to allocate a fixed amount of capital between their trading
and lending operations, the results of Liu and Pogach (2017) are consistent with our finding that,
ceteris paribus, banks with greater trading operations reduce foreign lending less than domestic
lending. We isolate the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on domestic and foreign lending by
augmenting the regressions by a three-way interaction term between Financial Crisis dummy, our
foreign lending variables, and our trading proxies in Table 4. Most of the three-way interaction
terms are negative and statistically significant. The marginal effects show that the effect of foreign
lending reverts during financial crisis.
The increase in loan supply to foreign markets by banks with more extensive securities trading
may simply reflect a greater degree of internationalization and a stronger specialization in the lending
business among banks with large trading operations relative to banks with smaller trading operations.
Banks with global lending operations may specialize in providing trade credit to exporters from
specific markets. For example, the Spanish bank Banco Santander, which we classify as a trading
bank, specializes in providing trade credit to Peruvian export firms (see Paravisini et al. (2017)).
De Haas and Van Horen (2012) show that banks generally reduce their loan supply to geographically
distant locations. This is consistent with the negative coefficients associated with log(Distance) and
Economic Distance in Table 3. However, De Haas and Van Horen (2012) also show that this effect
is counteracted if banks operate foreign subsidiaries or foreign branches or have lending experience
in a foreign market. Thus, the positive sign of the interactions between Trading Memberships or
Securities Trading and log(Distance) or Economic Distance may simply reflect a geographically
more dispersed branch network of banks with more extensive securities trading relative to banks
with less extensive securities trading. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to directly observe
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Table 3: Is Foreign Lending Affected Differently than Domestic Lending by Securities Trading?
Notes: In this table, we present the results regarding the effect of securities trading on loan supply in foreign
lending. The regression setup is as in Equation (1)) but augmented by different measures of distance between bank
and borrower. The unit of observation is firm cluster-year. Firm clusters are formed based on a firm’s country
of incorporation, the two-digit SIC code, and a firm’s credit rating, estimated based on the median EBIT interest
coverage ratios. Trading Memberships equals one if a bank has more than two trading memberships at securities
exchanges and zero otherwise. Securities Trading is the one-year-lagged USD value of a bank’s trading account
divided by its total assets. Both variables are interacted with the distance measures. Foreign Lending is a dummy
variable that equals one if a bank and borrower’s countries of incorporation are not the same. Distance is the
physical distance between a bank and borrower’s countries of incorporation. Economic Distance is the absolute
value of the difference in the KOF Globalisation Index of a bank and borrower’s countries of incorporation. All
regressions include bank-level controls (the logarithm of total assets, return-on-assets, common equity/total assets,
cash/total assets, and total loans/total deposits). The results for the bank controls are reported in Table B.2 in Ap-
pendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trading Membershipsi −0.359∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.031)
Securities Tradingi,t−1 −0.669∗∗∗ −0.729∗∗∗ −0.198∗
(0.149) (0.148) (0.114)
Foreign Lending −1.485∗∗∗ −1.511∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034)
log(Distance) −0.175∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Economic Distance −0.062∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Trading Membershipsi*Foreign Lending 0.406∗∗∗
(0.042)
Trading Membershipsi*log(Distance) 0.045∗∗∗
(0.005)
Trading Membershipsi*Economic Distance 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Foreign Lending 1.456∗∗∗
(0.152)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*log(Distance) 0.194∗∗∗
(0.018)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Economic Distance 0.011
(0.009)
Observations 267,326 267,326 266,257 267,326 267,326 266,257
Adjusted R2 0.413 0.416 0.386 0.413 0.416 0.385
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 4: Is Foreign Lending Affected Differently than Domestic Lending by Securities Trading? – Crisis Impact
Notes: In this table, we present the results regarding the effect of securities trading on loan supply in foreign lending. The
regression setup is as in Equation (1)) but augmented by different measures of distance between bank and borrower. The
unit of observation is firm cluster-year. Firm clusters are formed based on a firm’s country of incorporation, the two-digit
SIC code, and a firm’s credit rating, estimated based on the median EBIT interest coverage ratios. Trading Memberships
equals one if a bank has more than two trading memberships at securities exchanges and zero otherwise. Securities Trad-
ing is the one-year-lagged USD value of a bank’s trading account divided by its total assets. Both variables are interacted
with the distance measures. Foreign Lending is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank and borrower’s countries of in-
corporation are not the same. Distance is the physical distance between a bank and borrower’s countries of incorporation.
Economic Distance is the absolute value of the difference in the KOF Globalisation Index of a bank and borrower’s coun-
tries of incorporation. Financial Crisis is dummy variable that equals one if financial stress is above 5 and zero otherwise.
All regressions include bank-level controls (the logarithm of total assets, return-on-assets, common equity/total assets,
cash/total assets, and total loans/total deposits). The results for the bank controls are reported in Table B.3 in Appendix
B. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trading Memberi −0.281∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.031)
Securities Tradingi,t−1 −0.525∗∗∗ −0.596∗∗∗ −0.025
(0.151) (0.149) (0.106)
Trading Memberi*Foreign Lending 0.399∗∗∗
(0.043)
Trading Memberi*log(Distance) 0.042∗∗∗
(0.005)
Trading Memberi*Economic Distance 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
Trading Memberi*Financial Crisis −0.208∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.022)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Foreign Lending 1.322∗∗∗
(0.159)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*log(Distance) 0.178∗∗∗
(0.019)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Economic Distance 0.009
(0.009)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Financial Crisis −0.369∗∗∗ −0.333∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.122) (0.083)
Trading Memberi*Foreign Lending*Financial Crisis −0.048
(0.037)
Trading Memberi*log(Distance)*Financial Crisis −0.005
(0.004)
Trading Memberi*Economic Distance*Financial Crisis −0.006∗∗
(0.002)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Foreign Lending*Financial Crisis −0.446∗∗∗
(0.141)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*log(Distance)*Financial Crisis −0.061∗∗∗
(0.017)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Economic Distance*Financial Crisis −0.026∗∗∗
(0.009)
Observations 264,716 264,716 263,691 264,716 264,716 263,691
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.413 0.383 0.409 0.412 0.382
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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the branch networks of the banks in our sample. However, LPC DealScan does report some branch
information for loans in our sample in addition to the lender name. For example, for some loans
granted by BNP Paribas, DealScan reports “BNP Paribas Singapore Branch” as the lender name.
Thus, for each loan in our sample for which we have some indication of the specific branch that
granted the loan, we hand collect the branch country and use the great-circle distance formula to
compute the geographic distance between the branch country and the borrower country.13 While
this is a rather imprecise measure of a bank’s branch network, it may provide us with some general
insight regarding the degree of geographic dispersion of a bank’s lending business. We report the
average distances between the bank country and the borrower country on the one hand and the bank
branch country and the borrower country on the other hand in Table 5. We focus on the Trading
Memberships dummy variable to have a clear dichotomous separation of banks with more extensive
securities trading and less extensive securities trading. We find that for banks with more extensive
securities trading, the average geographic distance between the bank and the borrower is larger than
the distance between the branch and the borrower. Thus, banks use foreign branches to service
foreign customers. Additionally, we find that the average geographic distance between the branch
and borrower is lower for banks with more extensive securities trading than for banks with less
extensive securities trading. This indicates a greater geographic dispersion of the lending operations
and thus a higher degree of internationalization of banks with more extensive securities trading.
Hence, consistent with the results in De Haas and Van Horen (2012), the increased loan supply of
banks with more extensive securities trading to foreign markets seems to be driven by the greater
geographic dispersion of the lending operations of these banks.
13Note that in many cases, the bank country, branch country, and borrower country are different. For example, we
observe loans granted by BNP Paribas to borrowers in Malaysia or the Philippines via the Singapore Branch of BNP
Paribas.
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Table 5: DoTradingBanksHaveGeographicallyMoreDispersedLendingOperations thanNon-TradingBanks?
Notes: In this table, we report the average geographic distance between bank country and borrower country for
banks with more and less extensive securities trading. Trading Memberships > 2 indicates banks with more than
two trading memberships at securities exchanges and thus indicates more extensive securities trading. # Trading
Memberships ≤ 2 indicates the opposite. Avg. Distance Bank is the mean value of the logarithm of the geographic
distance between the bank country and the borrower country. Avg. Distance Branch is the mean value of the logarithm
of the geographic distance between the bank branch country and the borrower country. We report significance levels for
two-sided t-tests of the mean difference, allowing for unequal sample variance as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
# Trading Memberships > 2 # Trading Memberships ≤ 2 Difference
Avg. Distance Bank 4.813 4.027 0.786∗∗∗
Avg. Distance Branch 3.271 3.546 −0.274∗∗∗
Difference 1.541∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
4.2. Does Financial Market Depth Matter?
One of the key propositions in Boot and Ratnovski (2016) is that banks increase trading at the
expense of relationship banking activities, such as lending, as financial markets become deeper.
Boot and Ratnovski (2016) argue that bank lending involves building relationships with customers
and requires gathering private information about borrowers to gauge creditworthiness. On the other
hand, securities trading does not rely on private information. Deeper financial markets yield greater
trading opportunities and allow banks to conduct larger trades. Therefore, banks may choose to
allocate more resources to securities trading operations at the expense of their lending business as
financial market depth increases.
We augment our regressions with the IMF’s country-level financial market depth index.14 We
include the index in our regression in Equations (1) and (3) and interact it with Securities Trading
and the Trading Memberships dummy. All of these regression specifications include bank country
fixed effects. Thus, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of the within-bank
14The financial market depth index is a sub-index of the financial development index family. The financial market
depth index aggregates data on a country’s stock market capitalization divided by GDP, stocks traded divided by GDP,
international debt securities of the government divided by GDP, and total debt securities of financial and non-financial
firms divided by GDP. For further details regarding the data, coverage, and methodology of the Financial Development
Index and its sub-indices, see Svirydzenka (2016). We report summary statistics for the financial market depth index
per bank country in Table A.3 in Appendix A.
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country variation in financial market depth.
We report the results in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6. The individual effects of Securities
Trading and Trading Memberships are positive and significant, while the corresponding interaction
effects with the financial market depth index are negative and significant. Thus, the sign of marginal
effects associated with Securities Trading and the Trading Memberships dummy depends on the
specific value of the financial market depth index. For low levels of financial market depth, the
marginal effects associated with Securities Trading and Trading Memberships are positive. However,
as financial markets become deeper, the marginal effects decrease and eventually become negative,
as indicated by the negative sign on the coefficient of the interaction effects. This suggests that
banks with more extensive securities trading reduce loan supply more as the financial markets in
their home countries become deeper.
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Table 6: Financial Market Depth
Notes: In this table, we present the results regarding the effect of securities trading on loan supply moderated by financial
market depth. The regression specification is the same in Equations (1) and (3), augmented by the financial market
depth index and relevant interactions. The unit of observation is firm cluster-year. Firm clusters are formed based on a
firm’s country of incorporation, the two-digit SIC code, and a firm’s credit rating, estimated based on the median
EBIT interest coverage ratios. Trading Memberships equals one if a bank has more than two trading memberships at
securities exchanges and zero otherwise. Securities Trading is the one-year-lagged USD value of a bank’s trading
account divided by its total assets. Financial stress is the value of the Financial Stress Indicator as provided by the US
OFR for a bank’s country of incorporation. Financial Crisis is dummy variable that equals one if financial stress is
above 5 and zero otherwise. Financial Market Depth (Fin. Markets Depth) is the IMF’s financial market depth index.
All regressions include bank-level controls (the logarithm of total assets, return-on-assets, common equity/total assets,
cash/total assets, and total loans/total deposits). The results for the bank controls are reported in Table B.4 in Ap-
pendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)j,i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Securities Tradingi,t−1 3.339∗∗∗ 3.578∗∗∗
(0.501) (0.515)
Trading Membershipsi 0.161 0.274∗∗
(0.116) (0.120)
Financial Market Depthi,t−1 1.248∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 1.387∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.106) (0.113) (0.111)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Fin. Markets Depthi,t−1 −3.824∗∗∗ −4.016∗∗∗
(0.543) (0.555)
Trading Membershipsi*Fin. Markets Depthi,t−1 −0.384∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.131)
Financial Crisis −0.085 −0.141
(0.166) (0.136)
Fin. Markets Depthi,t−1*Financial Crisis 0.033 0.010
(0.197) (0.163)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Financial Crisis −0.273
(0.832)
Trading Membershipsi*Financial Crisis 0.297
(0.215)
Fin. Markets Depthi,t−1*Financial Crisis −0.080 −0.084
(0.194) (0.160)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Fin. Markets Depth*Financial Crisis −0.867
(0.965)
Trading Membershipsi*Fin. Markets Depthi,t−1*Financial Crisis −0.613∗∗
(0.257)
Observations 267,326 267,326 264,716 264,716
Adjusted R2 0.371 0.371 0.373 0.373
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Bank Country FE YES YES YES YES
We visualize the marginal effects associated with Securities Trading and the Trading Memberships
31
Figure 4: Marginal Effect
Notes: In this figure, we show marginal effects associated with the coefficient estimates reported in Table 6, columns
(3) and (4) for Securities Trading and Trading Memberships, respectively. The marginal effects are computed for a
range values of the financial market depth index. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence bands based on marginal
effects’ standard errors. Standard errors of the marginal effects are reported in brackets below the marginal effects. All
standard errors are derived from the clustered variance-covariance matrix of estimated coefficients associated with
Table 6, columns (3) and (4).
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dummy in Figure 4. The left panel shows that for countries with deep financial markets, the marginal
effect associated with Securities Trading is negative, while it is positive for countries with less deep
financial markets. The cutoff point at which the marginal effect becomes positive is approximately
0.87 for financial market depth. The right panel shows that for countries with deep financial markets,
the marginal effect associated with Trading Memberships is negative except for very low values of
financial market depth. This is in line with the rationale suggested by Boot and Ratnovski (2016),
whereby banks tend to re-allocate increasing resources from lending to securities trading as financial
markets become deeper. The marginal effects associated with the Trading Memberships dummy are
negative even for countries with relatively low financial market depth.
Additionally, in Table 7, we report the marginal effects associated with Securities Trading and the
Trading Memberships dummy at means of the financial market depth index for a number of example
countries with rather high and rather low values of financial market depth.
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Table 7: Marginal Effects and Financial Market Depth
Notes: In this table, we present the marginal effects associated with the coefficient estimates reported in Ta-
ble 6, columns (1) and (2) for Securities Trading and Trading Memberships respectively. Each marginal ef-
fect is computed at the time-series mean of the financial market depth index for the relevant country for the
sample period from 2003 to 2016. Standard errors of the marginal effects are reported in brackets below the
marginal effects. All standard errors are derived from the clustered variance-covariance matrix of estimated
coefficients associated with Table 6, columns (1) and (2). Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Country Financial Market Depth Marginal Effect at country mean
Securities Trading Trading Memberships
US 0.983 −0.420∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.029)
UK 0.979 −0.405∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.029)
The Netherlands 0.923 −0.191∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.027)
All Countries’ Average 0.870 0.012 −0.173∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.026)
Japan 0.733 0.536∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.033)
Germany 0.690 0.700∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.036)
Italy 0.637 0.903∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.041)
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 6, we focus on the financial crisis period by additionally interacting
Securities Trading and Trading Memberships with financial market depth and our financial crisis
dummy. We visualize the corresponding marginal effects in Figure 5. Qualitatively, the results are
the same as those presented in Figure 4. For low values of the financial market depth index, the
marginal effects during periods of financial stress and calm are not significantly different. If one
recalls that we reported in Figure 3 that the loan supply from banks with greater securities trading
declines even further during periods of financial market stress, the results in Figure 5 suggest that
this effect is primarily driven by banks located in countries with deep financial markets. Regarding
the marginal effects associated with the Trading Memberships dummy, the difference between effects
during financial crisis and calm periods is statistically significant only for financial market depth
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Figure 5: Marginal Effects and Crisis Periods
Notes: In this figure, we depict the marginal effects associated with the coefficient estimates reported in Table 6,
columns (3) and (4) for Securities Trading and Trading Memberships, respectively. Marginal effects are computed for a
range of values of the financial market depth index. Each marginal effect is shown if the financial crisis dummy equals
one and if it equals zero. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence bands based on marginal effects’ standard errors.
Standard errors of the marginal effects are reported in brackets below the marginal effects. All standard errors are de-
rived from the clustered variance-covariance matrix of estimated coefficients associated with Table 6, columns (3) and (4).
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index values greater than 0.63. Regarding the marginal effects associated with Securities Trading, the
difference between effects during financial crisis and calm periods becomes statistically significant
for financial market depth index values greater than 0.4. The steeper slopes of the lines indicating the
marginal effects during financial crisis indicate that financial market depth becomes more important
for lending during periods of crisis than during calm periods.
Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that the negative relationship between loan supply and
securities trading that we report in the previous sections is, to a large extent, driven by banks located
in countries with deep financial markets. We thus confirm the key propositions of Boot and Ratnovski
(2016). Moreover, we show that the strength of the response of trading banks’ loan supply to periods
of financial crisis is influenced by financial market depth. This suggests that the fire sale hypothesis
proposed in Shleifer and Vishny (2010) and Diamond and Rajan (2011) is more pronounced for
banks located in countries with deep financial markets.
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4.3. Loan Pricing
Results in the previous sections show that banks with more extensive securities trading tend to
reduce their loan supply. In this section, we analyze whether there are significant the differences in
loan pricing between banks with more and less securities trading. Higher loan prices translate into
higher cost of capital for borrowers. Since investments will have to at least earn their cost of capital,
increasing loan prices can hamper investments. Following an approach similar to Acharya et al.
(2018), we analyze loan pricing by using the change in average loan prices paid by firm clusters as
the dependent variable. We measure loan prices as the All-in Spread drawn, which equals the total
(fees plus interest) annual spread paid over LIBOR drawn from the loan. In particular, we calculate
All-in Spread drawn = Upfront fee + Annual fee + Utilization Fee + Interest Spread over LIBOR.
Thus, the All-in Spread drawn represents the cost of financing for the relevant borrower (see, e.g.,
Ivashina (2005)).
We present the results of this analysis in Table 8. Columns (1) and (3) contain the results
for Trading Memberships and Securities Trading without interaction with the Financial Stress
or Financial Crisis proxy. The remaining columns contain the results when also including these
interactions. Our results indicate that all of our sample banks increase loan prices during periods
of increasing financial stress. Moreover, we find that banks with more extensive securities trading
charge their borrowers higher prices for loans. A one-standard-deviation increase in Securities
Trading results in an approximately 23 bps increase in the average spread. Similarly, we find that
banks with more than two trading memberships increase spreads by, on average, 88 bps. However,
the interaction between the two effects is statistically insignificant. This indicates that while banks
with more extensive securities trading tend to charge higher prices during stable times, they do not
behave differently in terms of their loan pricing than banks with less extensive securities trading
when stress accumulates in financial markets.
Columns (5) and (6) contain results using our Financial Crisis dummy instead of the Financial
Stress Index. Recalling that the Financial Crisis dummy equals one if the Financial Stress Index
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takes values greater than five and zero otherwise, the specification in columns (5) and (6) captures
the effect around the peak of the 2008 financial crisis. Significance of the interaction between
Financial Crisis and Trading Memberships or Securities Trading would imply that only peak of 2008
financial crisis mattered for differences in loan pricing. Interestingly, the marginal effect associated
with Trading Memberships or Securities Trading becomes negative in this specification, indicating
a rather sharp decline in loan prices for banks with more extensive securities trading around the
peak of the 2008 financial crisis. The consistently positive and statistically significant coefficients
associated with the Financial Stress Index and the Financial Crisis dummy across all regression
specifications indicate that loan financing becomes more expansive as stress accumulates in financial
markets. As financial stress increases, it becomes more difficult for firms to obtain market financing,
allowing banks to charge higher prices for loans. Erel et al. (2011) show that only the highest quality
borrowers retain the ability to obtain market financing during periods of extreme financial stress.
Thus, higher loan prices may also reflect higher risk premiums paid by lower quality borrowers. The
marginal effects associated with the Financial Crisis dummy are positive in columns (5) and (6),
even after considering interaction terms with Trading Memberships or Securities Trading. Thus,
while all sample banks increased loan prices during the 2008 financial crisis, banks with more
extensive securities trading increased loan prices less during that time. Recall that our results in the
previous section show that banks with more extensive securities trading reduce their loan supply
more than banks with less extensive securities trading during periods of financial stress. In light of
this finding, our result that banks with more extensive securities trading increase loan prices less
than banks with less extensive securities trading suggests that these banks may attempt to retain
remaining corporate clients during such periods.
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Table 8: The Effect of Securities Trading on Loan Pricing
Notes: In this table, we present the results regarding the effect of securities trading on loan pricing. The regression
specification is similar to the specification presented in Equations (1) and (3). The unit of observation is the firm
cluster-year. The dependent variable is the change in logarithms in All-in Spread drawn, where we calculate All-in Spread
drawn = Upfront fee + Annual fee + Utilization Fee + Interest Spread over LIBOR. Firm clusters are formed based on a
firm’s country of incorporation, the two-digit SIC code, and a firm’s credit rating, estimated based on the median EBIT
interest coverage ratios. Trading Memberships equals one if a bank has more than two trading memberships at securities
exchanges and zero otherwise. Securities Trading is the one-year-lagged USD value of a bank’s trading account divided
by its total assets. Financial stress is the value of the Financial Stress Indicator as provided by the US OFR for a bank’s
country of incorporation. Financial Crisis is dummy variable that equals one if financial stress is above 5 and zero oth-
erwise. All regressions include bank-level controls (the logarithm of total assets, return-on-assets, common equity/total
assets, cash/total assets, and total loans/total deposits). The results for the bank controls are reported in Table B.5 in Ap-
pendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆(All-in Spread Drawn)ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Securities Tradingi,t−1 1.962∗ 1.822∗ 3.090∗∗∗
(1.065) (1.070) (1.097)
Trading Membershipsi 0.880∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.203) (0.216)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Financial Stress 0.458
(0.497)
Trading Membershipsi*Financial Stress −0.098
(0.126)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Financial Crisis −14.473∗∗∗
(4.760)
Trading Membershipsi*Financial Crisis −3.117∗∗
(1.248)
Financial Stress 0.595∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.245) (0.222) (0.237)
Financial Crisis 7.609∗∗∗ 6.664∗∗∗
(2.293) (2.224)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 200,570 200,570 200,570 200,570 200,570 200,570
Adjusted R2 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265
5. Borrower-level Analysis
5.1. Empirical Approach
The results in the previous sections indicate that banks with greater securities trading supply fewer
loans to non-financial borrowers than banks with less securities trading, even when considering
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the same borrower in the same year. The within-borrower regression specifications in the previous
sections do not allow us to assess the effect of banks’ securities trading on the aggregate borrowing at
the borrower level, as this includes loan flows from ending and new lending relationships. However,
borrowers may have the possibility to compensate for lower loan supply from banks with more
extensive securities trading with loans from banks with less extensive securities trading or by
obtaining market financing. Therefore, the regressions in the previous sections capture only the
intensive margin but not the extensive margin of the effect of banks’ trading on lending. If loan
flows from ending and new lending relationships represent an important margin of adjustment, then
the overall strength of the effect of banks’ securities trading on lending should be estimated at the
borrower level. We estimate the extensive margin following an approach similar to Khwaja and
Mian (2008) and Cingano et al. (2016) and implement the following model:
∆Aggregate Loansjt = λExposurejt + γˆjt +ΨFjt−1+
+αj + αCountry×Industry×Y ear + αForeign Loans×Y ear + εjt (4)
Fjt−1 is amatrix of borrower control variables. αj denotes borrower fixed effects. αCountry×Industry×Y ear
and αForeign Loans×Y ear represent borrower country× industry× year fixed effects and foreign loans
× year fixed effects. γˆ is the estimated loan demand, obtained as the fixed effects coefficients from
Equations (1) and (3). Since Equations (1) and (3) are estimated via the within-estimator, we do
not directly obtain estimates for the fixed effects coefficients. Instead, we obtain the fixed effects
as the solution to the equation Dγˆjt = (I −Q)(∆Log (LoanV olume)− βX), where X and β are
vectors containing all right-hand-side variables and coefficients from Equation (1). I is the identity
matrix, Q is a standard projection matrix for the within-estimator, and D is a matrix containing
dummies defining the firm cluster × year fixed effects. As γˆjt is the only unknown quantity in this
equation, we can solve it for γˆjt. Cingano et al. (2016) and Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette (2012)
show that including γˆjt in Equation (4) corrects for potential biases in the model due to potential
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correlation between the Exposurejt and loan demand. The coefficient of interest in Equation (4) is
λ, capturing the extensive margin of the effect of a bank’s securities trading on loan supply. We
expect λ to be negative if firm clusters that are exposed to trading banks cannot replace the lost loan
supply previously offered by trading banks with loans from non-trading banks.
Since we aggregate at the borrower level for the analysis in Equation (4), there are multiple ways
to measure exposure to banks’ securities trading. Exposurejt is a proxy for exposure of a borrower
to the securities trading of its lender banks and may be any of the following variables:
Trading Exposurejt =
∑
i
ωjit × Trading Memberships (5)
Trading Securities Exposurejt =
∑
i
ωjit × Securities Tradingi,t−1 (6)
Trading Exposure Stressjt =
∑
i
ωjit × Trading Memberships× FSIit (7)
Trading Securities Exposure Stressjt =
∑
i
ωjit × Securities Tradingi,t−1 × FSIit (8)
where ωjit is equal to the share of loans granted by each bank i to borrower j in year t and
Trading Memberships and Securities Tradingi,t−1 are defined as in the previous sections. FSIit is a
Financial Stress Index, measuring the level of stress in the financial market of bank i’s country of
incorporation. For example, Trading Exposurejt is simply the share of loans granted to a borrower
by banks with more extensive securities trading, and Trading Securities Exposurejt represents the
indirect exposure of borrowers to trading securities held by their lending banks. Moreover, by using
Trading Exposure Stressjt and Trading Securities Exposure Stressjt, we can capture the indirect
exposure to the interaction between trading and financial market stress. We report summary statistics
for all four exposure measures in Table 9.
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Table 9: Characteristics of Firm Clusters
Notes: In this table, we report the summary statistics for the firm clusters in our sample. Data for all firms
and foreign currency exchange rates are obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. All non-USD
values are converted to USD before any computations. The exposure variables are defined in Equations (5) – (8).
Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Trading Exposure 0.490 0.279 0.000 0.334 0.516 0.675 1.000
Securities Trading Exposure 0.147 0.070 0.001 0.105 0.151 0.194 0.416
Trading Exposure Stress 0.110 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 1.000
Securities Trading Exposure Stress 0.037 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.416
We report correlation coefficients for the correlation between each of the indirect exposure
variables and the estimated loan demand in Table 10. All of the correlation coefficients are negative
and statistically significant but rather small in magnitude. Recall that γˆ is the estimated loan demand.
Thus, the negative correlation between indirect exposure to banks’ trading and loan demand suggests
that there is an, albeit weak, tendency that of borrowers with high loan demand to borrow from
banks with less extensive securities trading. This reaffirms the importance of including the fixed
effects γ in our regression specifications in the previous sections to avoid bias from self-selection
(Jimenez et al., 2011). However, the low magnitude of the correlations suggest a rather weak effect
that appears to weaken further during financial crisis.
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Table 10: Correlations between Indirect Borrower Exposure and Loan Demand
Notes: In this table, we report correlations between indirect borrower exposure and loan demand. The exposure
variables are defined in Equations (5) – (8). γˆ is the estimated loan demand, obtained as the fixed effects coefficients
from Equations (1) and (3). Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Indirect Exposure:
Trading Exposure Trading Securities Exposure
γˆ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗
Indirect Exposure with Financial Stress:
Trading Exposure Stress Trading Securities Exposure Stress
γˆ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗
Finally, we are interested in the impact of borrowers’ indirect exposure to banks’ securities trading
on borrowers’ real economic activity. Therefore, we follow the approach in Acharya et al. (2018)
and regress capital expenditures, changes in cash holdings, and employment growth on our four
exposure variables. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
yjt = θExposurejt +ΨGjt−1 + αj + αCountry×Industry×Y ear + αForeign Loan×Y ear + ujt, (9)
where yjt =
[
Capex/TAjt, Employment Growthjt
]
. Exposurejt is any of the variables defined in
Equations (5) to (8). αj , αCountry×Industry×Y ear, and αForeign Loan×Y ear are fixed effects that are
defined in the same way as in Equation (4). Gjt−1 are borrower-level control variables. In line with
our hypothesis regarding real effects, we expect θ to be negative, indicating that firms with greater
exposure to trading banks suffer from a more restrictive loan supply and thus exhibit lower capital
expenditures, lower employment growth, and less cash available.
5.2. Results
We present the estimation results for Equation (4) in Table 11. Consistent with our results
in the previous sections, the estimated coefficients associated with Trading Securities Exposuret
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and Trading Exposuret are negative and statistically significant. Both coefficients also indicate an
economically significant effect size. A one-standard-deviation increase in indirect securities trading
exposure Trading Securities Exposuret leads to a 49 bps lower growth in aggregate loans. Moreover,
a one-standard-deviation increase in indirect trading exposure Trading Exposuret leads to a 121 bps
lower growth in aggregate loans.
Compared to the results concerning the intensive margin, reported in Table 1, these results suggest
that loan flows from exiting and new lending relationships pose an important margin of adjustment.
Aggregate loan growth for non-financial borrowers is suppressed by lending banks’ securities trading.
Borrowers do not simply move to borrow from banks with less extensive securities trading but reduce
their borrowing from banks overall. This leaves open the possibility that borrowers may replace
bank loans with market-based forms of financing such as issuing bonds or equity. Unfortunately, we
do not observe borrowers’ bond or equity issuance or the resulting cash flows. However, one would
expect that larger borrowers have easier access to market-based financing. In line with this notion,
in all regression specifications in Table 11, the estimated coefficients associated with total assets are
negative and statistically significant. This suggests that larger borrowers tend to borrow to a lesser
degree from banks than do smaller borrowers.
The estimated coefficients associated with the indirect exposure measures that are interacted with
the Financial Stress Index are negative but statistically not significant. Thus, there appears to be
no crisis impact of banks’ securities trading on the extensive margin of loan supply, implying that
during periods of financial stress, lending relationships are unaffected. Taken together with the
results regarding the intensive margin in the previous sections, this suggests that banks with more
extensive securities trading reduce their loan supply by lowering the volume of loans, not by ending
lending relationships.
Finally, we analyze whether the reduction in loan supply resulting from banks’ securities trad-
ing affects borrowers’ real economic activity. Specifically, we investigate the impact on capital
expenditures and employment growth using the regression specification in Equation (9). We present
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Table 11: Aggregate Loan Supply and Indirect Exposure to Securities Trading
Notes: In this table, we present the estimation results for the effect of banks’ securities trading on aggregate
borrowing at the borrower level. The regression follows the specification in Equation (4). The sample consists
of 1,716 individual firm clusters from 75 countries, examining the period from 2003 to 2016. The clusters are
formed by matching firms according to their (1) country, (2) industry, and (3) and EBITDA interest coverage,
following the approach in Acharya et al. (2018). Data for all firms and foreign currency exchange rates are
obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. All non-USD values are converted to USD before
any computations. Indirect exposure of firm clusters to their lending banks’ securities trading is measured
as defined in Equations (5) – (8). The results for the bank controls are reported in Table B.6 in Appendix B.
All standard errors are clustered at the firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Aggregate Loan Volume)t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trading Securities Exposuret −6.985∗∗ −8.157∗∗
(3.190) (3.397)
Trading Exposuret −4.329∗∗∗ −5.319∗∗∗
(1.101) (1.174)
Trading Securities Stresst −1.409
(1.742)
Trading Exposure Stresst −0.567
(0.485)
Estimated Loan Demand 0.319∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
Sales Growtht−1 0.356∗∗ 0.350∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.311∗∗
(0.146) (0.145) (0.157) (0.155) (0.157) (0.157)
log(Total Assets)t−1 −0.222∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.107 −0.122 −0.264∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.083) (0.086) (0.084) (0.089) (0.089)
Intangible Assets/TAt−1 −0.433 −0.351 −0.130 −0.041 −0.276 −0.283
(0.459) (0.451) (0.485) (0.468) (0.495) (0.496)
Leverage Ratiot−1 −0.633 −0.478 −0.742 −0.547 −0.540 −0.544
(0.650) (0.640) (0.687) (0.673) (0.697) (0.696)
EBITDA/TAt−1 −0.080 0.248 −1.236 −0.754 0.484 0.536
(5.472) (5.301) (5.749) (5.538) (5.567) (5.566)
Observations 13,659 13,659 13,659 13,659 11,521 11,521
Adjusted R2 0.614 0.619 0.578 0.585 0.617 0.618
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm cluster FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-Industry-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Foreign Loan-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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the estimation results for the specification with capital expenditures as the dependent variable in
Table 12 and those with employment growth as the dependent variable in Table 13. The estimated
coefficients of the indirect exposure variables defined in Equations (5) to (8) are not statistically
significant for any of the dependent variables. This is consistent with Chodorow-Reich (2014). Thus,
despite facing lower bank loan supply, borrowers’ real economic activity is not affected by their
indirect exposure to banks’ securities trading. This suggests that the borrowers in our sample can
replace the reduced loan supply with other means of financing when necessary.
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Table 12: Capital Expenditures and Indirect Exposure to Securities Trading
Notes: In this table, we present the estimation results for the effect of banks’ securities trading on aggregate borrowing at
the borrower level. The regression follows the specification in Equation (4). The sample consists of 1,716 individual firm
clusters from 75 countries, examining the period from 2003 to 2016. The clusters are formed by matching firms according
to their (1) country, (2) industry, and (3) and EBITDA interest coverage, following the approach in Acharya et al. (2018).
Data for all firms and foreign currency exchange rates are obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. All non-
USD values are converted to USD before any computations. Indirect exposure of firm clusters to their lending banks’ secu-
rities trading is measured as defined in Equations (5) – (8). The estimated coefficients for bank controls are reported in the
appendix. All standard errors are clustered at the firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: Capex/TAt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trading Securities Exposuret 0.018
(0.037)
Trading Exposuret −0.011
(0.010)
Trading Securities Stresst 0.016
(0.029)
Trading Exposure Stresst 0.0001
(0.008)
Sales Growtht−1 0.005 0.005 0.006∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
log(Total Assets)t−1 0.0004 0.0004 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Intangible Assets/TAt−1 −0.039∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Leverage Ratiot−1 −0.013 −0.013 −0.017∗ −0.017∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
EBITDA/TAt−1 0.374∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗ 0.338∗∗
(0.137) (0.138) (0.145) (0.145)
Firm cluster FE YES YES YES YES
Country-Industry-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Foreign Loan-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,659 13,659 11,521 11,521
Adjusted R2 0.755 0.755 0.738 0.738
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Table 13: Employment Growth and Indirect Exposure to Securities Trading
Notes: In this table, we present the estimation results for the effect of banks’ securities trading on aggregate borrowing
at the borrower level. The regression follows the specification in Equation (4). The sample consists of 1,716 individual
firm clusters from 75 countries, examining the period from 2003 to 2016. The clusters are formed by matching firms
according to their (1) country, (2) industry, and (3) and EBITDA interest coverage, following the approach in Acharya
et al. (2018). Data for all firms and foreign currency exchange rates are obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat
database. All non-USD values are converted to USD before any computations. Indirect exposure of firm clusters to
their lending banks’ securities trading is measured as defined in Equations (5) – (8). The estimated coefficients for bank
controls are reported in the appendix. All standard errors are clustered at the firm cluster level. Significance levels:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: Employment Growtht
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trading Securities Exposuret −0.021
(0.218)
Trading Exposuret −0.106
(0.072)
Trading Securities Stresst 0.055
(0.148)
Trading Exposure Stresst 0.023
(0.043)
Sales Growtht−1 0.459∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
log(Total Assets)t−1 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Intangible Assets/TAt−1 0.090∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.066 0.066
(0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046)
Leverage Ratiot−1 −0.035 −0.033 −0.016 −0.016
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
EBITDA/TAt−1 0.150 0.177 0.260 0.256
(0.660) (0.659) (0.688) (0.688)
Firm cluster FE YES YES YES YES
Country-Industry-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Foreign Loan-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,659 13,659 11,521 11,521
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.314 0.323 0.323
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the effects of banks’ securities trading on their lending over the business
cycle and during the financial crisis by analyzing a sample of banks and borrowers from 2003
to 2016, a period that spans both episodes in loan markets and financial market expansion and
contraction. Most studies investigating bank lending focus on banking in individual countries or
narrow geographical regions. However, large banks tend to operate globally across all of their
business lines, including lending and securities trading. Therefore, in this paper, we analyze a global
sample that includes 132 major banks from 21 countries and 7,763 borrowers from 76 countries
spanning North America, Europe, and Asia. At the intensive margin, our empirical specification
allows us to compare the loan flows to the same borrower from banks with more and less securities
trading but otherwise similar characteristics. We show that banks with more extensive securities
trading exhibit an approximately 20% lower annual loan growth than banks with less extensive
securities trading. At the extensive margin, we show that the reduction in loan supply due to more
extensive securities trading also extends to loan flows from new and exiting lending relationships.
Exploiting our global sample, we find that banks with greater securities trading reduce loan supply
to a greater extent in their domestic market than in foreign markets, despite an overall decline in
foreign lending. Moreover, we find that our results are primarily driven by banks that are located in
countries with deep financial markets.
Focusing on the additional impact of the financial crisis, the gap in loan supply between banks
with more extensive securities trading and those with less extensive securities trading increases
even further to approximately 31% lower loan growth during periods of financial crisis when stress
in financial markets is high. As for the overall effect, this additional crisis impact is driven by
banks located in deeper financial markets. Finally, although there is a significant reduction in loan
supply, we do not find a significant impact on real economic activity, such as investments in capital
and employment growth, on borrower side. This suggests that borrowers that cannot borrow from
banks due to the reduced loan supply can replace bank loans with other forms of financing, such as
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retaining earnings or issuing debt securities or equities. Thus, although policy makers are concerned
that banks allocate resources to securities trading activities at the expense of lending to non-financial
firms, such behavior has no impact on real economic activity. However, if central banks, through
there monetary policy, or other government institutions provide cheap funding to banks that are
significantly engaged in securities trading, it is likely that those funds flow into securities trading
rather than lending. This effect is likely to be stronger for banks located in countries with deeper
financial markets. Moreover, banks with extensive trading operations that need to allocate capital to
either trading or lending are more likely to cut lending in domestic than in foreign lending markets in
the absence of financial crisis. Therefore, monetary policy that is aimed at increasing bank lending
to non-financial firms after a crisis would likely be more effective if targeted explicitly at lending to
the real economy.
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Appendix A. Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Bank Characteristics
Notes: In this table, we present the summary statistics of the banks’ characteristics for our 1,603 bank-year observations.
The sample consists of 132 individual banks from 21 countries, examining the period from 2003 to 2016. Annual data
for all banks are obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. All the characteristics are converted from
local currency to USD using the unweighted average of the daily exchange rates in the relevant year. Daily foreign
currency exchange rates are obtained from Compustat. Total Assets is the book value of total assets. Trading Securities
is the USD volume of all trading and dealing accounts divided by total assets. Total Loans and Total Deposits are the
book values of all loans granted to non-bank clients divided by total assets and all deposits received from non-bank
clients divided by total assets, respectively. Accordingly, the Loans-to-Deposits Ratio is defined as the ratio of Total
Loans to Total Deposits. The Capital Ratio is the ratio of the book value of the stockholders’ equity to the book value
of total assets. The Liquidity Ratio is computed as cash/total assets. # Trading Memberships counts the number of
trading memberships in the ten largest security exchanges worldwide and is measured by market volume. Trading
Memberships is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a bank has at least one membership and zero otherwise.
# Trading Memberships> 2 is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a bank has more than two trading memberships.
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
log(Total Assets) 12.491 1.286 10.632 11.306 12.435 13.600 14.898
Trading Securities 0.087 0.116 0.000 0.003 0.033 0.130 0.677
ROA (in %) 0.582 0.543 −1.146 0.275 0.564 0.947 1.760
Capital Ratio 0.066 0.028 0.018 0.045 0.061 0.083 0.133
Liquidity Ratio 0.038 0.033 0.005 0.014 0.027 0.052 0.125
Total Loans 0.498 0.186 0.000 0.402 0.535 0.643 0.719
Total Deposits 0.575 0.240 0.000 0.419 0.616 0.767 0.882
Loans-to-Deposits 0.892 0.414 0.000 0.687 0.803 1.074 1.949
# Trading Memberships 2.025 2.865 0 0 1 2.8 10
Trading Memberships 0.628 –
# Trading Memberships > 2 0.250 –
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Table A.2: Banks by Region/Country
Notes: In this table, we present the number of banks per country/region and the corresponding mean values within a
relevant country/region. For the larger regions (the US, other advanced economies, and emerging economies), we also
report the standard deviation within regions in parentheses. log(Total Assets) is the logarithm of the book value of
total assets. # Trading Memberships counts the number of trading memberships in the ten largest security exchanges
worldwidemeasured bymarket volume. ∆log(Loan Volume) is the year-on-year difference in the logarithm of loan volume.
Country/Region # of Banks log(Total Assets) # Trading Memberships ∆log(Loan Volume)
US 41 13.071 3.789 1.803
(1.273) (4.564) (2.476)
Other Advanced 71 13.572 4.004 1.296
(1.064) (3.039) (2.150)
Canada 5 13.045 3.554 1.678
European Union 32 13.868 4.833 1.249
Switzerland 3 13.925 9.939 1.504
Japan 23 13.108 1.308 1.263
Australia 7 12.777 0.993 0.876
Emerging 24 12.857 1.073 0.568
(1.288) (1.117) (1.421)
China 13 13.992 1.885 0.627
Hong Kong 2 11.397 1.000 0.445
Singapore 2 12.084 0.000 0.591
South Korea 4 12.294 0.000 0.311
Taiwan 2 11.352 0.192 0.426
Brazil 1 12.554 1.000 0.586
54
Table A.3: Financial Market Depth
Notes: In this table, we present the summary statistics for the financial depth index for each bank country except
Taiwan. Data on the index are available through the website of the IMF. The financial market depth index is a
sub-index of the IMF’s financial development index. Details on the scope and computation of the financial devel-
opment index and its sub-indices can be found in Svirydzenka (2016). Financial market depth comprises data on a
country’s stock market capitalization divided by GDP, stocks traded divided by GDP, international debt securities
of the government divided by GDP, and total debt securities of financial and non-financial firms divided by GDP.
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Australia 0.916 0.046 0.817 0.898 0.913 0.951 0.984
Austria 0.487 0.064 0.376 0.455 0.482 0.500 0.637
Brazil 0.371 0.084 0.261 0.317 0.347 0.397 0.550
Canada 0.925 0.087 0.777 0.841 0.980 0.999 1.000
Switzerland 0.946 0.083 0.779 0.985 0.987 0.987 0.987
China 0.495 0.171 0.200 0.392 0.559 0.616 0.681
Germany 0.690 0.060 0.629 0.643 0.675 0.716 0.822
Denmark 0.618 0.116 0.364 0.562 0.661 0.678 0.782
Spain 0.897 0.058 0.806 0.839 0.909 0.942 0.978
Finland 0.747 0.086 0.543 0.728 0.764 0.812 0.843
France 0.856 0.060 0.792 0.824 0.851 0.856 0.988
UK 0.979 0.026 0.888 0.985 0.986 0.988 0.989
Hongkong 0.828 0.007 0.814 0.821 0.830 0.833 0.836
Ireland 0.583 0.048 0.506 0.550 0.581 0.616 0.686
Italy 0.637 0.061 0.564 0.589 0.621 0.695 0.738
Japan 0.733 0.097 0.536 0.687 0.729 0.799 0.894
Korea 0.750 0.106 0.591 0.661 0.792 0.834 0.879
Netherlands 0.923 0.043 0.832 0.897 0.931 0.941 0.989
Singapore 0.894 0.024 0.861 0.878 0.885 0.912 0.934
USA 0.983 0.017 0.925 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987
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Table A.4: Characteristics of Firm Clusters
Notes: In this table, we present the summary statistics for the firm clusters in our sample. The sample consists of
1,725 individual firm clusters from 76 countries, examining the period from 2003 to 2016. The firm clusters are based
on 7,763 individual firms, such that the average cluster consists of 4.5 firms. The clusters are formed by matching
firms according to their (1) country, (2) industry, and (3) and EBITDA interest coverage, following the approach in
Acharya et al. (2018). Data for all firms and foreign currency exchange rates are obtained from Standard & Poor’s
Compustat database. All non-USD values are converted to USD before any computations. log(Assets) is the logarithm
of the book value of total assets. Capex refers to the capital expenditure. Employment Growth is the year-to-year
change in the logarithm of the number of employees. Cash includes cash and cash equivalents. Net Debt is the sum
of short-term and long-term debt minus cash and cash equivalents. Short-term Debt is all debt with a remaining
time to maturity of up to one year, and Long-term Debt is all debt with a remaining time to maturity of more than one year.
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Capex/Assets 0.049 0.035 0.006 0.023 0.040 0.067 0.129
Employment Growth 0.028 0.155 −0.297 −0.041 0.015 0.087 0.387
log(Assets) 8.726 1.672 6.686 7.230 8.524 9.899 12.723
∆Cash/Assets 0.008 0.036 −0.053 −0.013 0.004 0.027 0.084
Net Debt/Assets 0.397 0.176 0.043 0.285 0.410 0.528 0.682
Intangible/Assets 0.161 0.165 0.005 0.023 0.097 0.261 0.551
Ebitda/Assets 0.008 0.009 0.00004 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.027
56
Appendix B. Control Variables
Table B.1: Securities Trading and Bank Lending – Controls
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the bank control variables associated with the regressions shown in Table
1. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sales Growthj,t 0.295∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038)
Leveragej,t −1.020∗∗∗ −1.009∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.136)
log(Total Assets)j,t 0.374∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Capex/TAj,t 0.071 0.069
(0.246) (0.246)
Net Debt/TAj,t 1.357∗∗∗ 1.351∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.118)
Employment Growthj,t 0.193∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029)
Firm Cluster-Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO
Bank Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Borrower Country-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Borrower SIC-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 267,326 267,326 267,326 267,326 267,326 267,326
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.076 0.375 0.376 0.215 0.216
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Table B.2: Is Foreign Lending Affected Differently than Domestic Lending by Securities Trading? – Controls
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the bank control variables associated with the regressions shown in Table
3. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Total Assets)i,t−1 0.647∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Liquidity Ratioi,t−1 3.176∗∗∗ 3.327∗∗∗ 1.943∗∗∗ 3.369∗∗∗ 3.584∗∗∗ 2.266∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.311) (0.318) (0.316) (0.315) (0.323)
ROAi,t−1 −0.386 −0.778 3.360 3.079 2.529 5.764∗∗∗
(1.959) (1.951) (2.068) (1.946) (1.936) (2.055)
Capital Ratioi,t−1 4.950∗∗∗ 4.992∗∗∗ 4.119∗∗∗ 5.610∗∗∗ 5.607∗∗∗ 4.352∗∗∗
(0.564) (0.564) (0.585) (0.574) (0.572) (0.601)
Loans-To-Depositsi,t−1 0.101∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Observations 267,326 267,326 266,257 267,326 267,326 266,257
Adjusted R2 0.413 0.416 0.386 0.413 0.416 0.385
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table B.3: Is Foreign Lending Affected Differently than Domestic Lending by Securities Trading? – Crisis
Impact
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the bank control variables associated with the regressions shown in Table
4. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign Lending −1.483∗∗∗ −1.471∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034)
log(Distance) −0.174∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Economic Distance −0.062∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Financial Crisis 0.134∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022)
log(Total Assets)i,t−1 0.636∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Liquidity Ratioi,t−1 2.119∗∗∗ 2.216∗∗∗ 1.340∗∗∗ 2.035∗∗∗ 2.165∗∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.214) (0.218) (0.221) (0.220) (0.226)
ROAi,t−1 6.016∗∗∗ 5.642∗∗∗ 8.200∗∗∗ 8.936∗∗∗ 8.301∗∗∗ 10.506∗∗∗
(1.483) (1.480) (1.547) (1.471) (1.467) (1.533)
Capital Ratioi,t−1 5.396∗∗∗ 5.476∗∗∗ 4.392∗∗∗ 5.905∗∗∗ 5.968∗∗∗ 4.488∗∗∗
(0.464) (0.464) (0.479) (0.473) (0.472) (0.492)
Loans-To-Depositsi,t−1 0.055∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Foreign Lending*Financial Crisis 0.067∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(0.025) (0.028)
log(Distance)*Financial Crisis 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Economic Distance*Financial Crisis 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 264,716 264,716 263,691 264,716 264,716 263,691
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.413 0.383 0.409 0.412 0.382
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table B.4: Financial Market Depth – Controls
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the bank control variables associated with the regressions shown in Table
6. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)j,i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Total Assets)i,t−1 0.476∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Liquidity Ratioi,t−1 1.121∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.216) (0.230) (0.217)
Capital Ratioi,t−1 3.503∗∗∗ 3.769∗∗∗ 3.340∗∗∗ 3.570∗∗∗
(0.498) (0.482) (0.501) (0.486)
Loans-To-Depositsi,t−1 0.111∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
ROAi,t−1 10.081∗∗∗ 9.680∗∗∗ 9.041∗∗∗ 8.689∗∗∗
(1.571) (1.584) (1.581) (1.595)
Observations 267,326 267,326 264,716 264,716
Adjusted R2 0.371 0.371 0.373 0.373
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Bank Country FE YES YES YES YES
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Table B.5: The Effect of Trading on Loan Pricing – Controls
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the bank control variables associated with the regressions shown in Table
8. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆(All-in Spread Drawn)ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Total Assets)i,t−1 −0.664∗∗∗ −0.667∗∗∗ −0.733∗∗∗ −0.727∗∗∗ −0.655∗∗∗ −0.715∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091)
Liquidity Ratioi,t−1 −8.956∗∗ −8.968∗∗ −7.607∗ −7.487∗ −9.096∗∗ −7.140∗
(4.150) (4.150) (4.135) (4.140) (4.166) (4.133)
Capital Ratioi,t−1 27.382∗∗∗ 27.656∗∗∗ 26.338∗∗∗ 26.046∗∗∗ 24.373∗∗∗ 22.831∗∗∗
(7.276) (7.298) (7.077) (7.098) (7.237) (7.019)
Loans-To-Depositsi,t−1 −0.925∗∗ −0.904∗∗ −0.939∗∗ −0.947∗∗ −1.029∗∗ −0.980∗∗
(0.427) (0.427) (0.412) (0.411) (0.425) (0.408)
ROAi,t−1 −54.386 −54.282 −53.682 −54.427 −52.481 −48.915
(42.376) (42.374) (40.872) (40.847) (41.911) (40.479)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 200,570 200,570 200,570 200,570 200,570 200,570
Adjusted R2 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265
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Table B.6: Aggregate Loan Supply and Indirect Exposure to Securities Trading – Controls
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the bank control variables associated with the regressions shown in
Table 11. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Aggregate Loan Volume)t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Liquidity Ratiot−1 1.662 0.746 1.682 0.657 0.045 0.126
(5.036) (5.095) (5.578) (5.606) (5.381) (5.382)
Capital Ratiot−1 47.098∗∗∗ 40.337∗∗∗ 69.137∗∗∗ 59.479∗∗∗ 49.155∗∗∗ 49.624∗∗∗
(12.138) (12.083) (12.937) (12.821) (13.222) (13.145)
ROAt−1 46.703 36.372 50.613 37.035 39.279 39.871
(35.282) (35.042) (37.262) (37.173) (37.914) (37.945)
Loans-To-Depositst−1 0.366 0.384 0.149 0.185 −0.082 −0.082
(0.558) (0.561) (0.587) (0.589) (0.637) (0.639)
Total Assetst−1 0.869∗∗ 0.901∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗ 0.781∗∗
(0.364) (0.352) (0.391) (0.378) (0.385) (0.384)
Observations 13,659 13,659 13,659 13,659 11,521 11,521
Adjusted R2 0.614 0.619 0.578 0.585 0.617 0.618
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm cluster FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-Industry-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Foreign Loan-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Appendix C. Estimating Fixed-Effects Models with Aggregated Observations
We now discuss the implications of applying our model (1) and model (9) regressions to firm
clusters rather than individual firms. This appendix relies heavily on Veredas and Petkovic (2010).
Generally, we are interested in estimating a model of the following form:
yz,t = γz + βfz,t + uz,t (C.1)
where z = 1, 2, ..., Z indexes individual firms. However, as in our specifications for model (1) and
model (9), we must aggregate individual firms into groups j = 1, 2, ..., J with J < Z. Thus, we
define an aggregation scheme such that
y˜j,t =
Z∑
z=1
M jzyz,t (C.2)
whereM jz = 1 or 0, such that
∑J
j=1
∑Z
z=1M
j
z = J , i.e., we sum the individuals belonging to group
j. We further require
∑Z
z=1M
j
zM
j′
z = 0 ∀ a′ 6= a, i.e., that individual firms can belong to only one
group. Without loss of generality, we consider a simplified case with only a single independent
variable and only individual fixed effects. We focus on a specification equivalent to our model (9).
All results shown below can easy be applied to apply to our model (1) specification.
Applying this aggregation scheme to the regression equation, (C.1) yields
Z∑
z=1
M jzyz,t =
Z∑
z=1
M jzγz +
Z∑
z=1
βM jzfz,t +
Z∑
z=1
M jzuz,t (C.3)
y˜j,t = γj + βf˜j,t + u˜j,t (C.4)
Thus, the population slope parameter is not affected by the aggregation, as we assume slopes are
constant for individual firms. The group fixed effects γj are simply the sum of the individual fixed
effects in each group. Note that in terms of our model ((1), we have x˜i,t = xi,t, since the control
variables are bank-level rather than firm-level variables, and
∑Z
z=1M
j
z = 1.15
To understand how aggregation affects parameter estimation and inference, we write the model
in matrix notation. 
y1
y2
...
yZ
 =

γ1eN
γ2eN
...
γZeN
+

f1
f2
...
fZ
 β +

u1
u2
...
uZ

Y = G+ Fβ +U (C.5)
where yz and fz are (N × 1) vectors containing the observations for individual firm z. γz are
15Obviously, the same applies to the bank country-year fixed effect.
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individual firm fixed effects and eN are (N × 1) vectors of ones. uz are (N × 1) vectors of iid
individual firm error terms with E(uz) = 0 and E(uzu′z) = σ2uIN, where IN is an identity matrix
of size N.
We introduce our aggregation scheme by defining the following matrix:
M =

M11 M
1
2 · · · M1Z
M21 M
2
2 · · · M2Z
... ... . . . ...
MJ1 M
J
2 · · · MJZ
 (C.6)
Hence, the aggregation in Equation (C.2) can be written in matrix notation as (M⊗ IN)Y. With
A = (M⊗ IN), we can write Equation (C.4) as
AY = AG+AFβ +AU (C.7)
Therefore, it follows directly that we have E(AUU′A′). Hence, the aggregation of firms into firm
clusters produces heteroskedastic error terms since the values along the diagonal of E(AUU′A′)
differ.
To estimate the coefficient β, we define a standard projection matrixQ to de-mean observations
Q = IN − 1
N
eNe
′
N (C.8)
Q˜ = IZ ⊗Q (C.9)
Thus, we have
Q˜AY = Q˜AG+ Q˜AFβ + Q˜AU
= Q˜AFβ + Q˜AU (C.10)
Therefore, it follows directly that the estimated coefficient has the following form:
βˆ = (F′A′Q˜AF)−1F′A′Q˜AU (C.11)
Since E(U) = 0, we have E(βˆ − β) = 0, i.e., the estimator is unbiased. Under finite sample
properties, the variance of βˆ is
E
[
(βˆ − β)(βˆ − β)′
]
= (C.12)
=(F′A′Q˜AF)−1F′A′Q˜E(AUU′A′)Q˜AF(F′A′Q˜AF)−1
Thus, it is straightforward to obtain heteroskedaticity-robust standard errors by applying a common
sandwich estimator of variance to the aggregated data.
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Appendix D. Additional Results
Table D.1: Is Foreign Lending Affected Differently than Domestic Lending by Securities Trading? – No Data
Imputation
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the regressions shown in Table 3 but
do not impute data for the year 2016 for Economic Distance. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)j,i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trading Memberi −0.359∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.031)
Securities Tradingi,t−1 −0.669∗∗∗ −0.729∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗
(0.149) (0.148) (0.118)
Foreign Lending −1.485∗∗∗ −1.511∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034)
log(Distance) −0.175∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Economic Distance −0.065∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
log(Total Assets)i,t−1 0.647∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Liquidity Ratioi,t−1 3.176∗∗∗ 3.327∗∗∗ 2.015∗∗∗ 3.369∗∗∗ 3.584∗∗∗ 2.358∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.311) (0.333) (0.316) (0.315) (0.337)
ROAi,t−1 −0.386 −0.778 6.397∗∗∗ 3.079 2.529 8.799∗∗∗
(1.959) (1.951) (2.130) (1.946) (1.936) (2.118)
Capital Ratioi,t−1 4.950∗∗∗ 4.992∗∗∗ 3.851∗∗∗ 5.610∗∗∗ 5.607∗∗∗ 4.134∗∗∗
(0.564) (0.564) (0.595) (0.574) (0.572) (0.612)
Loans-To-Depositsi,t−1 0.101∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Trading Memberi*Foreign Lending 0.406∗∗∗
(0.042)
Trading Memberi*log(Distance) 0.045∗∗∗
(0.005)
Trading Memberi*Economic Distance 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Foreign Lending 1.456∗∗∗
(0.152)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*log(Distance) 0.194∗∗∗
(0.018)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Economic Distance 0.013
(0.009)
Observations 267,326 267,326 252,882 267,326 267,326 252,882
Adjusted R2 0.413 0.416 0.382 0.413 0.416 0.381
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table D.2: Is Foreign Lending Affected Differently than Domestic Lending by Securities Trading? – Inter-EEA
lending as domestic lending
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the regressions shown in Table 3 but all lending where bank and borrower
are incorporated in the European Economic Area (EEA) is considered domestic lending in the definition of the
variables Foreign Lending, log(Distance), and Economic Distance (i.e., all three variables are zero for inter-EEA
loans). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-firm cluster level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)j,i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trading Memberi −0.389∗∗∗ −0.408∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030)
Securities Tradingi,t−1 −0.811∗∗∗ −0.886∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗
(0.120) (0.120) (0.111)
Foreign Lending −1.260∗∗∗ −1.348∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031)
log(Distance) −0.148∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Economic Distance −0.060∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
log(Total Assets)i,t−1 0.641∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Liquidity Ratioi,t−1 2.960∗∗∗ 3.039∗∗∗ 1.949∗∗∗ 3.263∗∗∗ 3.363∗∗∗ 2.302∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.313) (0.318) (0.316) (0.316) (0.323)
ROAi,t−1 −1.427 −1.398 3.069 2.103 2.037 5.500∗∗∗
(1.978) (1.975) (2.067) (1.966) (1.963) (2.054)
Capital Ratioi,t−1 4.505∗∗∗ 4.483∗∗∗ 4.072∗∗∗ 5.110∗∗∗ 5.084∗∗∗ 4.272∗∗∗
(0.568) (0.568) (0.585) (0.581) (0.580) (0.601)
Loans-To-Depositsi,t−1 0.088∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Trading Memberi*Foreign Lending 0.470∗∗∗
(0.038)
Trading Memberi*log(Distance) 0.059∗∗∗
(0.004)
Trading Memberi*Economic Distance 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Foreign Lending 2.101∗∗∗
(0.132)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*log(Distance) 0.259∗∗∗
(0.015)
Securities Tradingi,t−1*Economic Distance 0.021∗∗
(0.008)
Observations 267,326 267,326 266,257 267,326 267,326 266,257
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.408 0.386 0.407 0.408 0.386
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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